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It is well understood that a tax wbich distorts relativeprices
generates a welfare cost or "excess burden" in addition to any associated
transfer of resources, but there remains considerablecontroversy and
confusion with respect to procedures for measuring thisexcess burden.
The purpose of this paper is to clarify mattersconcerning what is
one of the most basic concepts in welfare economics. We describe and
evaluate a number of alternative conceptual experiments whichmight lie
behind an excess burden calculation, showing how these notionscan be


















It is well understood that any tax (or subsidy) that distorts relative
prices away from a pareto optimum generates a welfare cost or "excess burden"
in addition to any associated transfer of resources. With respect to proce-
dures for measuring excess burden, however, there is considerable controversy
and confusion. We think this Is attributable to two main causes. First of
all, various investigators have had different conceptual experiments in mind
when computing excess burden. Second, given the choice of conceptual experi-
ment, methods used to represent and numerically approximate excess burden
can vary, and few authors have made their choices
explicit.
The purpose of this paper is to clarify matters concerning the theory
and measurement of what is one of the most basic concepts in welfare economics.
In the following section, we describe a number of alternative conceptual
experiments which might lie behind an excess burden calculation, how these
notions can be represented graphically and algebraically, and appropriate
methods for approximating them numerically. In Section III we evaluate the
various measures on the basis of several criteria. Section IV contains
explicit numerical simulations to illustrate some of the issues raised in
Section III. We conclude the paper with a summary and suggestions for future
research.
II. Alternative Measures of Excess Burden
Suppose that the government levies a proportional tax on a commodity.
The excess burden of the tax equals the loss in welfare due purely to the—2—
tax—induced distortion in relative prices. Though this is the standard
definition, it begs two important questions. First, there is no indication
of how this loss in welfare ("utils") is to be converted into a dollar
measure. Second, though this loss may depend on the disposition of tax
receipts, the definition fails to specify how they are used. Although
various resolutions of these ambiguities have been suggested, it is not
always clear how their differences affect the excess burden measure. This
section shows how various concepts of excess burden arise, and how these
measures can be represented and approximated.
A. Consumers' Surplus Measures
The simplest representation of any welfare change resulting from a change
in price is Marshall's notion of consumers' surplus. Consider an individual
with endowment y0 who consumes some quantity of a commodity x when its price
is p0. Figure 1 depicts the ordinary demand curve for x, D(y0), where the
presence of y0 in parentheses indicates that money income is held constant
as price varies. Suppose first that, for some reason, the price of x rises
to with no change in income or other prices. Consumer demand drops to
and the loss in consumers' surplus is defined by the area pTACPO. The intui-
tive idea here is that the height of the demand curve represents a willingness
to pay for each successive unit of x, so that the integral over x of the
difference between this amount and the actual price represents a rent to the
consumer.
Now, suppose further that this price increase from p0 to p is due
entirely to the imposition of a tax; that producer prices are fixed and
profits are zero.1 Under these circumstances, government collects revenue—3—
equal to the area p1ABp0 which, by assumption, is disposed of in a way which
has no repercussions on the demand for x. Thus, the loss in consumers'
surplus exceeds collected revenue by the area ABC, which we may view as the
excess burden due to the tax.
As drawn in Figure 1, the demand curve D(y0) is not linear. Typically,
investigators use some second—order Taylor approximation in calculating the
area ABC, which has the effect of assuming the demand curve to be linear and
therefore makes the measured area a triangle. One such approximation is
represented in Figure 1 by the area A'B'C, which is obtained by taking the
excess burden to be a function of price and expanding around the initial price
x(y0,p)
p0. This area equals — . (Ep),where x(.) is the ordinary
p=pO
demand function and Lp =p—
p0.
One could just as easily have expanded
around the final price p, which would yield the area ABC', or around one of
the quantities x0 and x. This is entirely an arbitrary decision, as is that
to use a second—order rather than a higher—orderapproximation.2 In this
paper, we will generally follow the common convention of using a second—order
expansion around the initial point suggested by the conceptual experiment.
Figure 2 presents the general equilibrium analogue of Figure 1 for the
case where there are two goods, consumption x and leisure 9., and the consumer
has an initial endowment y0 of labor, which we take as numeraire. The slope
of the initial budget line is — .Pointc represents the initial
p0
consumption point and corresponds to point C in Figure 1. At this initial
equilibrium, the consumer attains a utility level U00, as shown by the
tangency of the initial budget line and the indifference curve labelled u00.
The rise in price to p is depicted by a flattening of the budget line, with—4—
utility dropping to U0 at point a, corresponding to point A in Figure 1.
As the budget line pivots downward, the purchases of x trace out the demand
curve D(y0) between p0 and p. The tax revenue collected, corresponding to
the area pTABpO in Figure 1, equals the horizontal distance between the two
budget lines starting at point a.
Although the consumer's surplus measure is used fairly often4 to repre-
sent the extent to which the utility loss between U00 and U0 exceeds in
money terms the revenue collected, it suffers from a number of problems, the
most important of which is the way it converts utils to dollars. As is well—
known, consumers' surplus is a consistent measure of any price—induced welfare
change only when there are no income effects in the demand for the affected
good(s). In general, if more than one price changes, the measure of the
total welfare effect is not single—valued, but depends on the path of the
price changes. For example, if two prices increase, one will find two
different measures of the induced welfare loss depending on which price is
assumed to increase "first." Related to this problem of path—dependence is
the result that if several prices change, leaving utility unaffected, the
consumers' surplus change taken by adding over affected markets in any
particular order is unlikely to be zero.
In their efforts to "rehabilitate" consumers' surplus, Hicks (1946)
and, more recently, Willig (1976) have discussed the potential error involved
in using consumers' surplus as a measure of welfare loss. Willig has shown
that in many cases, the difference between consumers' surplus and other
measures which do not suffer from the above shortcomings is very small relative
to the size of the welfare loss itself. However, these results relate to the
accuracy of the area pACpo as a measure of total welfare loss, not to the
accuracy of area ABC as a measure of the excess burden. Indeed, because—5—
excess burden is a second—order effect, it may well be true that consumers'
surplus leads to a very poor measure of excess burden.5 We will elaborate
upon this point once we have introduced the other methods for measuring
excess burden.
B.Income Compensation Measures
As just noted, in the consumers' surplus measure of excess burden, taxes
are assumed spent in such a way that there are no repercussions on the demand
for the taxed goods. Harberger (1974), reasoning along lines suggested by
Hotelling (1938), offers a different conceptual experiment:
When a new tax or set of taxes is imposed, we conceive of it
as being counterbalanced by a pattern of lump—sum subsidies
(and possibly lump—sum taxes) which keeps the relative distribution
of income unchanged. (p. 22)
For our one—consumer, two—good economy, this experiment is illustrated in
Figure 3, where the initial equilibrium of point c is again depicted.. Here,
as the tax is levied, causing the slope of the budget line to decrease,
revenues are simultaneously rebated. The consumer takes these rebates to be
unrelated to purchases of x. Thus, the equilibrium must be characterized by
two conditions:
(i) the marginal rate of substitution equals the post—tax price ratio
and
(ii) the optimizing bundle, shown at point d, lies on the initial budget
line through point c.
In effect, then, the equilibrium is found by taking a budget line whose slope
is given by post—tax prices, and 'sliding' it down the original budget line—6—
until a tangency with an indifference curve occurs at the intersection of the
two lines, as is true at d. Note that at this point, the individual's
endowment y2 is implicitly defined by the expression
=
y0+p x(y2,p) (1)
Following our earlier convention, we denote the utility attainable at
endowment y2 and price p as U2. Since U00 >U2
,andthe government keeps
no revenue, there is an excess burden, measured in utility terms by (Uoo_U2T).
In his writings, Harberger devotes his effort to developing and explaining a
second—order Taylor approximation, which is pictured in Figure 4. If we let
Dh(y0) represent the demand curve generated when the government rebates all
revenues as p rises, then point D in Figure 4, the point on this demand curve
at p =T' correspondsto point d in Figure 3.(Note that, by construction,
the regular demand curve D(y2) would also pass through point D.) The drawing
of this income—compensated demand curve as steeper than the ordinary one
corresponds to the assumption that x is a normal good.
Harberger measures excess burden by the area DEC, and, following Hotelling,




where xh(.) is the income—compensated demand for x. This approximation
yields the familiar "Harberger triangle" D'E'C as a measure of excess burden.
However, as we shall see later, the conceptual experiment depicted in Figure 3
lends itself to other interpretations which lead to alternative measures.
Unfortunately, Harberger's method suffers from the same difficulties as the
simpler consumers' surplus approach. Once again, by taking an area under a
demand curve where different points correspond to different levels of utility,—7—
path—dependence and related problems are encountered. These problems are,
perhaps, "less bad" here because the utility changes are smaller along Dh than
along D, but in general one cannot obtain a quantitative measure of the
relative errors.
C. Utility Compensation Measures
Building upon the work of Mohring (1971), Diamond and McFadden (1974)
have proposed a definition of excess burden that differs from Harberger's:
•. .Weshall define the deadweight burden, or loss, as the excess
of the income we give a consumer to restore him to his pre—tax
indifference curve over the tax revenue collected from him... While
it is not clear that this is the most intuitive notion, for consis-
tency we measure the tax revenue for this definition as the level
collected at the consumer equilibrium after the consumer has been
restored to his original Indifference curve.(p. 5)
Note that the compensation process is defined in terms of utility, not income
as in the Harberger experiment.
Figure 5 presents a general equilibrium representation of the Diamond—
McFadden experiment. Again, the initial budget line has slope — andpasses
p0
through c. Its intercept on the horizontal axis is y0, the consumer's labor
endowment. The new budget line faced by the consumer is one which allows
attainment of the initial utility level, at point f, and has slope — •By
construction, this new budget line must intersect the horizontal axis at the
endowment necessary to attain utility level 1J00 at price p. A convenient
algebraic representation of this distance is given by the expenditure function6
E(U00,p) =E0
•(Weuse the convention here that =E(U.,p.).)—8—
Within the framework, the excess burden is measured by the extent to which
tax revenue raised in the new state falls short of the increment in endowment,
(E0 —y0),needed to attain U00. It is depicted in Figure 5 by the distance
between y0 and the horizontal intercept, z0, of the line which has slope —
p0
and passes through the new equilibrium point f. Since y0 =E(U00,p0),we may
express this distance as
E(U00,p) -E(U00,p0)
-LIp.xC(U,p). (2)
where c(.) is the utility compensateddemand for x.
To interpret this conceptual experiment in terms of the area beneath a
demand curve, note that by definition the demand for xalong u00 as p increases
from p0 to p is xC(U00,p), represented by the demand
curve D'(U00) in Figure 6. Point F corresponds to point f in Figure 5. It is
not hard to see that the area p FCp0 is in fact exactly equal to the increase
in expenditure (E0 —y0).Since the derivative of the expenditure function









Moreover, since the revenue collected is the area pFGp0, the area of FGC
equals the excess burden (z0 —y0)shown in Figure 58 That this measure is
not path—dependent is evident from the fact that its expression in (2) depends
only on the initial and final equilibrium.9
Even though the region FGC is smaller than the "Harberger" area DEC
(again, assuming that x is a normal good), its Taylor approximation around
c(U
10 . . . 1Xoo"' 2
p0 is the same, since itequals— CAp)and the slopes of
p p0—9—
income—compensated and utility—compensated demand curves are equal at their
point of intersection. Thus, once again, excess burden is approximated by
the area of the triangle D'E'C. This result is, in a way, unfortunate,
because it obscures the fact that the underlying measures really do differ.
The form of the utility compensation approach just outlined is described
by Hicks( 1946) as "compensating variation": the additional income that must
be given to the consumer to compensate for the introduction of the distortion
assuming all tax revenues as rebated. One can also imagine constructing a
measure based on Hicks' "equivalent variation": the amount of income the
consumer would be willing to relinquish to be rid of the distortion. To
derive such a measure,11 we imagine starting out at the post—distortion equil-
ibrium shown by point d in Figure 7 (repeated from Figure 3), where y =y2
and
= andask how much we can lower y if p is lowered to p0, given that
utility must remain at U2. By definition, the income required to attain
utility level U21 at price p0 is E(U2 ,p0), shown as Ein Figure 7. Thus,
since tax rebates drop from (y2 —y0)to zero as p drops from p1 to p0, and
the equilibrium shifts to point h, the consumer is willing to give up an addi-
tional sum equal to12
E(U2,p) —E(U2,p0) —L\p.xC(U2,p)
. (4)
It is at once evident from comparing (4) to (3) that the two utility—compensa-
tion measures of excess burden differ only in the choice of base utility
level. In particular, the measure in (4) will equal the area under the com-
pensated demand curve calculated at utility U2. This is shown by the area
DEll in Figure 8, the left shaded area. Note that the utility—compensated
demand curve Dc(U21) intersects the income—compensated demand curve Dh1(y0) at— 10—
pointD, the starting point of the conceptual experiment just described. (The
x(U ,p 2
corresponding Taylor approximation is — (Ap)).Forpurposes
of comparison, we also shade the area FCC, which we showed represents the
compensating variation of the distortion. Note that, as long as x is normal,
each of these areas must be smaller than the area DEC, Harberger's measure of
excess burden.
Though this equivalent variation measure is also path independent, it is
distinct from the compensating variation approach of Diamond and McFadden.
This difference may be represented as an index number problem in the choice of
which prices to use in measuring a change in real income. Looking first at
the compensating variation, we recall that equation (2) defines the distance
between y0 and z0 in Figure 9. Since the original budget line through point
c also passes through point d, we are also measuring the income required to
move from point d to point f. These are the points on the indifference curves
U2 and U00 which would be chosen by the consumer when= Nowconsider
our equivalent variation measure, which equals (y0 —E).
This also measures
the income required to go from point h to point c, the points on u2T and u00
which would be chosen at p =p0.
Thus, our two measures of excess burden
offer two measures of the real income difference between u00 and one,
compensating variation, at post—tax prices and the other, equivalent variation,
at pre—tax prices.
We suggested earlier that the problem with Harbergers notion of excess
burden lies not in his conceptual experiment, but in its implementation. As
we have just demonstrated, both of the measures discussed in this section are
nothing more than income measures of the utility loss caused by introducing the
price distortion while refunding revenue, which is precisely Harberger's way of— 11—
lookingat the problem. Unfortunately, his demand curve measure corresponds
to neither of the Hicksian variations.
The choice between compensating and equivalent variation is no easier
than the choice of a price index. To paraphrase a point first made by Hicks,
the compensating variation of introducing a distortion equals the equivalent
variation of removing it. We could ask how much the consumer must receive to
compensate for a distortion being introduced, or how much he must be given in
place of the distortion being removed. Thus, our choice may depend on which
we consider to be the logical "initial situation." As pointed out by Hause
(1975), if we are starting at some situation a, the equivalent variations of
going from a toand a to y (whereand y are two alternative situations)
are the same if and only if the consumer's utility is the same atand y.
The measures are comparable because we use the same set of prices, those effec-
tive at a, in the two calculations. Since the compensating variations of
these two movements use different price ratios (those prevailing atand y,
respectively) they are not exactly comparable. Thus, if a is the initial
point, we may wish to use equivalent variation as a measure of the welfare
change between a and .However,ifis the initial point, the same argument
suggests that we should use the equivalent variation betweenand a, which is
the compensating variation between a and 13.
D. The Disposition of Revenues
In the previous two subsections, we have focused on measures centered
around the Initial, pre—tax point, labelled C in Figure 8 (and c in Figure 9).
We could just as easily have started at point A, assuming the initial condi-
tion to be with the tax already imposed. For example, performing Harberger's— 12—
experiment,we could have asked how much lower utility is in the post—tax
situation at A than it would have been had the same revenue been raised
through lump sum taxes. This experiment is depicted in Figure 10. Point a
represents the post—tax equilibrium, chosen at income y0 and price p and
yielding utility UQT (see Figure 2). Point i is the equilibrium which would
have occurred had the government instead collected the same amount of revenue
through lump sum taxes. Here, the individual would begin with net endowment
y1 and face price p0. Because of the distortion, U0< U10 even though
government revenue is the same in the two cases. The relationship between
points i and a is the same as that between c and d in Figure 3, except that
the first two points lie on the post—revenue budget line through y1, the
latter set on the initial budget line through y0.
As before, we can measure the utility loss (U10—UY by compensating
variation or equivalent variation,13 measuring the distance between the indif—
ference curves at points chosen when p =p(starting at point a) or at points
chosen when p =p0(starting at point 1). In terms of the expenditure function,





E(UqP) —E(U0,p0) —pxc(U0,p) (equivalent)
We could picture them in Figure 8 by drawing the income—compensated demand
curve D1'(y1) which passes through point A, and then adding the utility—compen-
sated demand curves Dc(U0) and Dc(U10). The first of these two curves passes
through point A, and the second passes through the point where the Dh(y1)
curve intersects the p0 price line. The corresponding Taylor approximations
are— 13—
1 2 —
-- (ip)for the compensating variation and
p P0
C
(1J0,p) 2 —- (np)for the equivalent variation.
E. Summary
In Table 1, we collect the various measures of excess burden.
(The blanks in the table are due to the fact that, as stressed
above, neither simple consumers' surplus nor the area under the
income—compensated demand curve lends itself to an interpretation in terms
of the underlying preference structure. A natural question at this point is
whether the. various measures are all that different. We provide below some
simulation results which illustrate how the measures and their approximations
depend on the size of the distortion and the structure of consumer preferences.
III. Evaluating the Measures
The investigator trying to decide whether or not to use a given measure
is likely to ask at least three questions:
(a) Is the conceptual experiment appropriate?
(b) Are the informational requirements necessary to implement the measure
reasonable?
Cc) How serious are aggregation problems?
We consider each of these questions in turn.
A. The Conceptual Experiment
As Table 1 illustrates, the various measures differ with respect to the
"initial" level of income and the set of prices used for comparing alternatives.— 14—
Wepointed out above that the second of these differences is an index number
problem, with the basis of choice being what the actual initial state of the
economy is. The issue of which income level to use is a bit tricky. One
might want to argue on a priori grounds that the pre—tax level is appropriate,
since in a general equilibrium setting, if the economy as a whole is to stay
on its budget constraint, the resources raised through taxation must be
returned in some form. From a behavioral point of view, however, a case can
be made for the post—tax measures. For many taxes, it is unclear in what form
individuals reclaim the receipts, if at all. (See, e.g.,Kay 1980, p. 112.) To the extent
this is the case, then, measuring excess burden around post—tax income will be more approiate
A third way in which measures differ is thether they are exact or some
Taylor approximation of an exact measure. Since use of the latter must
inherently introduce some error (assuming the exact measure is appropriately
chosen), there must be some other argument in its favor. Typically this deals
with the amount of information necessary to use it.
B. Informational Requirements
An important consideration for the applied welfare economist is how much
information is required to implement each measure. In this section we consider
this issue in a setting where the investigator has data on the individual's
economic behavior (e.g., from a cross—section sample). In section C below we
examine the problem when only aggregate demands are known.
The consumers' surplus appears to be the easiest measure to implement.
All that is required is an econometric estimate of the ordinary demand curve.
With that in hand, it is a simple matter to integrate underneath it, and find
the relevant areas.—15—
On the other hand, the "exact" formulations of Table 1 seem to have
greater informational requirements. One must "know" the entire utility
function into order to implement these measures.'4 But the differences in
informational requirements are more apparent than real. In order for the
whole welfare economics exercise to make sense, it must be assumed that the
ordinary demand curve is generated by some utility function. But if this is
the case, then it is in general possible to integrate the demand function to
find the utility function that generated it)5 Alternatively, one can postulate
ordinary demand curves based upon a specific utility function from the coef-
ficients of the demand equation.16
In short, the information requirements for the consumers' surplus
measure and the exact measures are virtually identical. Why, then, are the
consumers' surplus measures used so much more than expenditure function
measures? There are several explanations. In some cases, the functional
specification of the ordinary demand curve is sufficiently complicated that
integration is infeasible. In other cases, consumers' surplus measures are
implemented without an explicit demand function. Rather, 'consensus' values
of price elasticities are culled from the literature, and these are used to
approximate the excess burden triangle.'7 Thus, there is no function under
which to integrate. Finally, it may be that some investigators believe that
their econometric estimates are only a rough approximation to the demand
curve, and are not willing to view them as having been generated by a utility
function.
We turn now to the second—order Taylor approximations of Table 1. All
the information required to implement them is also in the ordinary demand
curve, The latter allows estimation of income effects and uncompensated price
effects, and the Slutsky equation shows how to combine these in order to find— 16—
approximationsto the compensated price responses needed in Table 1. In a
sense, then, it is hard to understand why one would ever use an approximation.
If the utility function itself can be inf erred from the ordinary demand curve,
why settle for the approximation? As before, the approximations may be
preferred to their exact analogues when either: (a) The investigator has
elasticity estimates but no explicit demand curve, or (b) integration of the
ordinary demand curve is infeasible.
We conclude that if the ordinary demand function for an individual is
available and feasible to integrate, then the expenditure function formulations
can and should be implemented. In cases where only price and income effects
are available, then the corresponding Taylor approximations should be used.
18
Only when the sole piece of information is the ordinary price elasticity of
demand is it necessary to rely upon the consumer's surplus measure.
C. Aggregation Problems
We now turn to the question of the relative merits of the various
measures when information regarding behavior comes to the investigator in
aggregate form. For example, much of the debate concerning the excess burden
of capital income taxation is based upon elasticities from aggregate savings
functions.
There are two separate problems which arise when an investigator must
deal with aggregate data. First, as is well—known, aggregate demand functions
will correspond to some underlying "aggregate" preference ordering or utility
function only under very special conditions: in general, the Engel curves of
19
each household must be linear and possess the same slope. If these condi—
tions fail to be met, there exists no "aggregate individual" to whom we can— 17—
applythe exact measures derived above. However, even if these conditions do
not obtain, it may be feasible to compute an exact utility function by applying
Roy's Identity to the aggregate demand equation, either by imposing the
assumption that the equation correspond to an underlying utility function, or
being fortunate enough for this constraint to be satisfied by unconstrained
estimates. Should this "pseudo—utility function" be used to calculate excess
burden? The answer is, not necessarily. If preferences differ among house-
holds, then by applying one of the exact measures to the aggregate consumer
we will misrepresent the actual loss, which should be calculated by summing
the losses incurred by individual households. This leaves us in a rather
unsatisfactory position. What should we calculate when we lack the disaggre—
gated data necessary for an exact answer? There are two possibilities:
Ci) An exact measure generated by the aggregate individual's
expenditure functions if the latter can be computed
(2) A second—order approximation of (1) (If no utility function can
be computed, this is the only option.)
In the next section we evaluate these options using simulations.
IV. Simulation Results
In this section, we seek to answer two questions. First, given that any
of the four exact measures of excess burden seem equally preferable a priori,
how different can they be? In some sense, we are asking how wide the bounds
are on the excess burden being measured. Second, how good are the exact and
second—order measures as estimates of the excess burden when applied to
aggregate data?— 18—
Considera simple example. Suppose that, as above,
there are two commodities, goods and leisure, the
former having relative price p. Suppose further that each consumer maximizes
a Cobb—Douglas utility function:
1
U1 =(x')°'() (6)
where x1 and are consumption of goods and leisure by individual i and
is a taste parameter. The consumer's budget constraint is:
i i I DX + (7)
where y is individual i's endowment or "full income" (including compensating
taxes or transfers where appropriate).
To solve for the various measures in Table 1, we must know the compensated
demand function for x, the indirect utility function, and the expenditure
function which correspond to (6) and (7). These three functions are, respec-
tively (suppressing superscripts)
Xc(U,P) =l1_a)p(l)U (8a)
a (1—a) —a v(y,p) =a(1—a) p y (8b)
E(U,p) =a(l_a)paU (8c)
All that remains before applying the formulas in Table 1 is to calculate y1
and y2. The first is less than y0 by the amount of revenue collected when
y =y0
and p =p; the second equals the amount of income which results when











yO+ ip.x(y2,p )= y0+ px(U2,p) (9b)— 19—
pT—p0
Substituting (8) into (9a) and (9b), and letting i equal ,weobtain:
y1 =y0(l—aT) (l0a)
=y0/—cT) (lOb)
We can now use (8) and (10) to solve explicitly for the four utility—
compensated measures outlined in Table 1. The results are shown in Table 2.
The four exact measures can be summarized by the expression
[(lT)a(1cLT) —1](P0/P)Y
(11)
where i and j are the indices that correspond to the subscripts of the utility
level, U1, appropriate for the particular formulation. Because (l_T)a < (1—aT)
for all a between 0 and 1, the largest estimate of excess burden is compensating
variation at pre—tax income (CV1), the second largest is equivalent variation
at pre—tax income (EV1), with the two post—tax measures following in the
same order. From largest to smallest, the measures differ by a factor of
(1T)a. For a =.5,this means the smallest measure is about lO—l/2 percent
lower than the largest if t =.2,but almost 30 % lower if T =.5.As one
would expect, the bigger the price change, the more severe the Index number
problem. Similarly, the bigger is a, the share of the taxed good, the bigger
the differential. For T =.2,If a equals .8, the differential is 16%. If
a equals .2, it is reduced to 4%. In general, then, there is sensitivity
among the measures to tax rates and tastes, but the bounds present for a
typical case do not seem unreasonably large. Perhaps what we should gain from
this exercise is the realization that even ttexactH measures do differ, and
substantially so if one Is considering substantial tax changes.—20—




where i and j are, as before, the indices of the utility level appearing in
the relevant expression. Here, the differences can be quite substantial, even
for reasonable parameters. For example, if T =.2,the CV1 measure is more
than 50% larger than the EV11 measure. Clearly, the linearization of demand
curves makes the choice of initial point important.
We now consider the aggregation question. First note that the
individual's demand for x is
x1(y',p) = (13)
However, the investigator using aggregate data estimates
x(,p) = (14)
whereis aggregate income and a is the average value of c, weighted by
income. Clearly, it is easy to apply Roy's Identity to (14) and find the
associated utility function. But a glance at equation (13) indicates that
the income slopes of our two individuals differ. Therefore as noted above,
the use of equation (14) to compute excess burden for the aggregate individual
will generate an erroneous result.
In light of that fact, an investigator faces several questions:(a) If
he uses an expenditure function based on (14), how far will his exact measure
21
of excess burden depart from the "true" one? (b) If all he has are price
and income responses from the aggregate demand function, (and cannot work back— 21—
tothe "aggregate individual" expenditure functlon), how far will measures
based upon the second order approximation depart from the true one? (c) When
there is a choice between (a) and (b), which should be used? Question (c) is
non—trivial: Given the fact that approximion error is involved in either
case, the additional error caused by the second—order approximation might be
unimportant or, conceivably salutary.
In Table 3 we present simulation results for the first measure of compen-
sating variation for the case where
=.3and =.7,so that a =.5.Reading from
left to right, the columns present the tax rate t,thecorrect measure of
excess burden (expressed as a fraction of measured income), the measure calculated
from the aggregate demand curve,
22
and their respective Taylor approximations.
For small tax rates, the aggregation error is small, as is the approximation
error. For example, for t= .05,the aggregation error is only 5.6 %,while
the approximation error is —5.00 %.Makingboth errors actually helps; the
approximation of the aggregate measure is only .4 % above the correct value.
When taxes increase, the aggregation error remains roughly constant at
5.6 % of the actual excess burden. However, though the second—order approxi-
mations differ little from each other, they both misrepresent substantially
23 . th,eactual excess burden. Other simulations not presented corroborate this
qualitative result. While this is of course a rather specific example, it
does suggest that even though the aggregate individual expenditure function
does not "really" exist, it may nevertheless be a very useful tool for welfare
cost measurement. When available, it should be given as serious consideration
as second order approximations.— —
V.Concluding Remarks
Our intent has been to provide for the practitioner a guide to the theory
and estimation of the excess burden of taxation. The first step was to
explain precisely the differences between the several measures that have
appeared in the literature. We then indicated how the choice of a measure
depended upon the conceptual experiment relevant to the investigator's
concern.
A major practical problem we discussed was how much information is
required to implement each measure. This question is particularly important
because for a number of issues, the relevant data come to us only in aggregate
form (say, in a time series), and we therefore lack information on the under—
lying structure of preferences in the population. Some simulation results
suggest that treating an aggregate demand function "as if" it were generated









































An Equivalent Vatiation Measure
Figure 8
Equilibrium" Measure



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0.0500000 0.0003114 0.0003289 0.0002958 0.0003125
0.1000000 0.0013139 0.0013679 0.0011833 0.0012500
0.1500000 0.0031275 0.0033034 0.0026625 0.0028125
0.2000000 0.0058992 0.0062306 0.0047333 0.0050000
0.2500000 0.0098129 0.0103630 0.0073958 0.0078125
0.3000000 0.0151001 0.0159443 0.0106500 0.0112500
0.3500000 0.0220577 0.0232866 0.0144958 0.0153125
0.4000000 0.0310723 0.0327956 0.0189333 0.0200000
0.4500000 0.0426579 0.0450098 0.0239625 0.0253125
0.5000000 0.0575131 0.0606602 0.0295833 0.0312500Footnotes
'The assumption of fixedprices and zero profits allow us to ignore the
possibility of efficiency losses on the production side of the economy.
2See Green and Sheshinski (1979) for furtherdiscussion of third—order
vs. second—order measures.
3The linear budget linecorresponds to the fixed—producer price assump-
tion made above: we continue to focus on this case rather than the more
general one where relative prices depend, through a convex production possibil-
ities frontier, on the mix of production. This framework is probably adequate
for most problems in applied welfare economics, although it is clearly inap-
plicable in some special cases (e.g., a Leontief technology).
4
See, e.g., Laidler (1969).
5mis point has been madeby Rosen and Small (1979) and Hausman (1979).
concise and elegant treatment of expenditure functions is given in
Diamond and McFadden (1974).
7See Diamond and McFadden (1974).
is now easy to demonstrate the point made earlier about the possible inade-
quacy of consumers' surplus as an excess burden measure even when it is a good approx-
imation to the total welfare loss. While the area p
ACp0may be a reasonable
approximation of the area p FCp0, the same cannot be said of ABC as an approximation
of FGC.
9For thecase where there are several goods and price changes, x and p
can be interpreted as vectors, with no change in the result.101t might seem more sensible to expand aroundT'sincewe are compen-
sating in the presence of the distortion. However we follow conon practice
here.
11We are unaware o any previous use in the literature on excess burden.
By the definition ofy2 in (1), we could rewrite (4) as E(U00,p0)—
E(U2
,p0); however, the current expression permits easier comparison with the
previous measure using compensating variation.
13The equivalent variation measure has been used by Rosen (1978) and
Kay (1980).
14More precisely, for each of the measures Itall that is needed is the
shape of one indifference curve. (See Hause 1975). In most contexts, however,
an investigator infers the shape of any given indifference from the overall
utility function.
To do so, one need only take advantage of Roy's identity, which relates
the ordinary demand curve to partial derivatives of the indirect utility
function. See Hausman (1979).
See, for example, Wales and Woodland (1976).
17See, for example, Laidler (1969) for Harberger (1964).
Taylor approximation is chosen will depend in part on the points




Here, we use the fact that s(y,p) =x(v(y,p),p).
210fcourse, "truth" is conditional on choice of conceptual experiment.221f anything, we areunderstating the error normally incurred by using
the aggregate demand curve since we have taken the distribution of income over
a, and hence a, to be constant. Normally,would vary, and the use of a
constant aggregate taste parameter when computing the underlying utility
function would introduce additional error.
23The negative bias is dueto the positive second derivative of the
compensated demand curve which we ignore in using a second—order approximation.References
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